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1. Introduction
At the Lisbon Summit 2000 the EU set herself the goal of transform-
ing the European Union by 2010 into “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. I take this 
statement as a starting point for this paper for two reasons: On the one hand 
it acknowledges the crucial role of knowledge in an advanced economy. 
On the other hand, it raises the question what needs to be done in order to 
achieve this ambitious goal. In particular, since the EU is also committed to 
a market economy and the maintenance of competition the question arises 
how well markets function with respect to the creation and distribution of 
knowledge, and what measures may be required, either to support the mar-
ket mechanism or to replace it by some other institutions.
This article deals with the ﬁrst question and offers a survey of the prob-
lems encountered in markets dealing with knowledge. In the next section I 
discuss brieﬂy the role of knowledge and information in economics. After 
that I point out a few difﬁculties with ﬁnding a precise and generally accept-
ed deﬁnition of knowledge. Section 4 is the core of the article and discusses 
various types of market failures which might occur when the commodity 
produced and traded is knowledge. I conclude with a few suggestions for 
further research.
2. The role of knowledge and information in economics
Knowledge and information deserve a central role in economics for at 
least three reasons:
1) In advanced economies the information sector contributes around 50% to 
Gross Domestic Product, and it has been the fastest growing sector over 
the last twenty years. 
2) Research, development and innovations are main contributors to econom-
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ic growth and explain up to 50% of the increase of labor productivity. 
3) Accounting for information poses a major challenge to economic theory 
in almost all of its branches.
Even though there is now general agreement about the importance of 
knowledge and information it took some time before this was fully reﬂected 
in economics, both at a theoretical and at an empirical level. It is remarkable 
that “Austrian” economists who were contemporaries of Wittgenstein were 
among the pioneers in this area.
Fritz Machlup was the ﬁrst to point out the growing importance of the 
“creation and distribution of knowledge” (Machlup 1962, 1980) and is con-
sidered as “one of the fathers of thinking about what has come to be labeled 
the information society and the information economy.” (www.caslon.com.
au/biographies/machlup.htm). 
Joseph Schumpeter realized very early the crucial role of innovations for 
economic growth and introduced the famous concept of “creative destruc-
tion” into economics. While his ideas have been neglected in mainstream―
i.e. neoclassical―economics for a long time they are now widely believed 
to be the most solid foundation for both, theory and policy of economic 
growth (Aghion and Howitt 2005).
Friedrich von Hayek, a nephew of Ludwig Wittgestein’s mother, insisted 
for a long time that a market economy is superior to a centrally planned 
economy because it is much more efﬁcient with respect to the creation and 
utilization of social knowledge, which is scattered in a society and can never 
be efﬁciently centralized (Hayek 1945). Ironically, later research which was 
at least partly inspired by Hayek has shown that markets are far less efﬁcient 
when it comes to creating and distributing knowledge or information than he 
apparently believed (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz 1980), though he appears to 
have been correct with respect to the still greater inefﬁciency of central plan-
ning. It is the main theme of this paper to discuss problems and shortcomings 
of markets when it comes to dealing with knowledge and information. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that the problems associated with knowledge 
and information as commodities are only a comparatively small part of the 
problems that are dealt with in the so called economics of information (see 
Stiglitz 2001). 
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3. Some deﬁnitions 
So far we have treated knowledge and information as synonyms and re-
frained from offering a precise deﬁnition of either. There are several good 
excuses for this:
Consulting dictionaries or encyclopedias does not get us very far. In the 
most popular source of wisdom for the internet generation we learn that 
“knowledge is deﬁned (Oxford English Dictionary) variously as (i) facts, in-
formation, and skills acquired by a person through experience or education; 
the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject, (ii) what is known in a 
particular ﬁeld or in total; facts and information or (iii) awareness or famili-
arity gained by experience of a fact or situation (Wikipedia).” Actually, in 
my version of the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary the word “facts” 
is replaced by “understanding”. In any case, looking at various dictionaries 
makes one feel even worse than Chruchill when dealing with economists. He 
once complained that when asking three economists one gets four opinions, 
two of them from Mr. Keynes. Looking at three dictionaries one would be 
happy to get just four deﬁnitions of “knowledge”. In fact, the one I liked best 
can be found in the Webster Handy College Dictionary, where knowledge is 
deﬁned as “awareness of facts, truths, or principles; a body of accumulated 
facts”. Interestingly, it was the only source I found where “knowledge” and 
“information” are not treated as more or less synonymous.
No wonder that one of the current pundits of the information society not-
ed, “the distinction between information and knowledge is a tricky one” 
(Benkler 2006, p.313). I am not sure whether his own deﬁnition is really 
satisfactory: “[he uses] information … colloquially, to refer to raw data, sci-
entiﬁc reports of the output of scientiﬁc discovery, news and factual reports. 
“Knowledge” refer[s] to the set of cultural practices and capacities necessary 
for processing the information into either new statements on the information 
exchange, or more important in our context, for practical use of the infor-
mation in appropriate ways to produce more desirable actions or outcomes 
from action” (Benkler 2006, p.313).
Machlup (1962), who attempted to  measure the magnitude of the produc-
tion and distribution of knowledge distinguished ﬁve types of knowledge: 
• practical knowledge, 
• intellectual knowledge,
• pastime knowledge, 
• spiritual or religious knowledge,
• unwanted knowledge, accidentally acquired and aimlessly retained.
Curiously, he included the distribution of typewriters and stationery as part 
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of this knowledge industry. In any case, the distinction between knowledge 
and information is again somehow blurred. 
Another eminent economist of this generation, Kenneth Boulding, made 
the following observation: “There is a little terminological problem here, 
that the word “knowledge” in English has some tendency to approach the 
meaning of “truth”. We have really no convenient word to describe the con-
tent of the human mind without regard to the question as to whether this cog-
nitive content corresponds to anything outside it. For this reason I have in 
the past used the term “image”… I will revert to the term “knowledge” with 
a warning that I make no assumption about the content of people’s minds 
being true”. (Boulding 1966, p.1). 
I am afraid that I cannot get any further than this, and I hope that for my 
purposes it is not necessary to do so. I shall use “information” and “knowl-
edge” as synonyms, unless stated otherwise, and I follow Boulding: “I shall 
become very pragmatic at this point and consign the philosophical problems 
to my esteemed colleagues who make this their specialty, and I shall assume 
simply that knowledge exists” (Boulding 1966, p. 2). And, I might add, even 
though we may not be able to deﬁne knowledge in a precise way, we rec-
ognize it when we encounter it, at least when discussing it in the context of 
markets for knowledge.
4. Knowledge as a commodity and market failures
4.1 The ﬁrst welfare theorem
One of the most remarkable achievements of economics in the 20st cen-
tury was the so called “general equilibrium theory” and its welfare theorems. 
The main result of the “Arrow-Debreu-Model” is that in an economy with 
a complete set of perfectly competitive markets an equilibrium exists and is 
Pareto-efﬁcient, i.e. there is no waste (Arrow and Debreu 1954). It would 
be quite misleading, however, to take this result as a proof for the overall 
efﬁciency of a (capitalist) market economy. In fact, quite the contrary is 
true since the conditions for this result to hold are listed meticulously, and 
it is quite obvious that they are extremely unlikely to be satisﬁed in any real 
world economy. If one or more of these conditions are violated efﬁciency of 
an equilibrium (if one exists) is no longer guaranteed and we get what has 
been termed market failure. Now the occurrence of market failures does not 
necessarily mean that free markets are inferior to other ways of organizing 
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economic activities, but at least they make it worthwhile to think about al-
ternatives.
The main causes of market failures are market power, externalities, public 
goods (for deﬁnitions see below) and various forms of imperfect information. 
What is remarkable for our topic is the fact that knowledge as a commodity 
is very likely to induce all these traditional causes of market failures (Allen 
1990) and, as if this were not enough, add a few more not encountered with 
other commodities. In what follows I shall discuss some of these market fail-
ures in markets for knowledge in more detail. For the sake of completeness 
I should like to add that of course not all types of knowledge will under all 
circumstances display all or even one of the causes for market failures. The 
claim is rather that for each type of market failure one can ﬁnd some type of 
knowledge leading to this market failure.
4.2 Knowledge and market power
Knowledge and (market) power may be linked in various ways, and I 
shall conﬁne myself to discussing two aspects:
4.2.1 Economies of scale and scope
A main reason for the existence of big ﬁrms who obviously have consid-
erable market power are economies of scale and scope, i.e. the fact that it is 
less costly to produce given volumes of outputs within one large corporation 
rather than in many small independent ﬁrms. One reason for this phenom-
enon, which is also referred to as “sub-additivity of costs” is the existence 
of large ﬁxed costs which have to be incurred regardless of the volume of 
output.
A moment’s reﬂection shows that such economies of scale and scope are 
likely to exist in the production of many types of knowledge. Consider the 
compilation and processing of huge amounts of data. There are large ﬁxed 
costs for setting up the appropriate hardware, and similarly one needs ﬂex-
ible and powerful software. In comparison the costs of using both for the 
generation of information by feeding in data are small.
Or think of University departments. Certainly in economics, but I sus-
pect Philosophy is not so different, a critical mass of researchers with some 
variety of expertise is needed in order to achieve success and make it to the 
upper segments of rankings. It is not just economies of scale―the bigger, 
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the better―but also economies of scope that can be utilized: If various lines 
of research and expertise can be combined the chances for new and relevant 
results will improve.
Whether economies of scale and scope will actually translate into mar-
ket power depends on the appropriability of the knowledge generated. As I 
shall discuss in some detail below knowledge very often cannot (and quite 
frequently should not) become the private property of anyone. With basic 
scientiﬁc research as conducted in universities this is pretty obvious. But of 
course there exist other types of knowledge with a large potential for proﬁt-
able commercial use. It is knowledge that allows the production of known 
goods at lower costs or of new or better goods. An economic agent in posses-
sion of such knowledge can use it in two―not mutually exclusive―ways: 
She can either use it for producing and selling goods herself, thus selling 
knowledge indirectly embodied in her products, or she can sell the knowl-
edge to somebody else. As we shall see below the second option has several 
difﬁculties, but for the moment I would like to concentrate on the ﬁrst one.
4.2.2 Arrow’s dilemma
Now suppose somebody has succeeded in creating knowledge that could 
be used in a commercially proﬁtable way. If she retains exclusive possession 
of this knowledge then she obviously has a monopoly implying a socially 
inefﬁcient use of productive resources in the short run: In order to exploit 
her monopoly she will produce less than the social optimum and charge a 
price above marginal costs. The ﬁrst welfare theorem would require that 
her knowledge becomes available to everybody in order to ensure perfect 
competition. However, if the creation of proﬁtable knowledge is costly and 
risky, who would ever bother to engage in such activities if she is forced to 
give away her knowledge immediately after she gets it? So here we have 
a problem pointed out by Arrow back in 1962: There is a conﬂict between 
short run efﬁciency which would require that socially useful knowledge be-
comes accessible to everybody, and long run efﬁciency which would require 
that economic agents are willing to make the investment and take the risk 
of creating such knowledge because they will be able to enjoy a handsome 
return by exploiting a (temporary) monopoly proﬁt (Arrow 1962). Needless 
to mention that the problem has not been solved yet―and presumably never 
will be. Ongoing debates about intellectual property rights, patents, copy 
rights and open source are a clear indication that Arrow’s dilemma has not 
lost its importance, though it has come up in different guises.
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4.3 Knowledge and externalities
One of the currently most popular introductory text books in economics 
offers the following deﬁnition: An “externality arises when a person engages 
in an activity that inﬂuences the well-being of a bystander and yet neither 
pays nor receives any compensation for that effect” (Mankiw 2005, p.204). 
In this dramatic age of global climate changes we associate with externalities 
usually negative effects like the pollution of water and air or the emission 
of greenhouse gases. New knowledge, respectively its use, however, very 
often causes positive externalities. Suppose again that an entrepreneur has 
made an innovation, say discovered a new technology that enables him to 
reduce the (marginal) costs of production drastically―meaning she enjoys 
a monopoly. Of course she will make a very handsome proﬁt, but consum-
ers will beneﬁt as well: In order to maximize her proﬁts the innovator will 
pass on part of the cost reduction to consumers. This affects their well-be-
ing, but they do not compensate the entrepreneur fully―they enjoy a posi-
tive externality. But there may also be other beneﬁciaries: Consumers who 
need less of their income for buying the good will increase their demand 
for other goods―especially if they are complements of the good that has 
become cheaper. Alternatively, the innovation may reduce the costs of pro-
duction or the quality of other goods―the progress that has been made with 
respect to electronic equipment has revolutionized the production of many 
other goods. In short, even if the new knowledge remains exclusively with 
the innovator positive externalities will be created with the effect that the 
private return to the innovation is considerably smaller than the social one. 
There exist various estimates of private and social returns to research and 
development, and while the absolute ﬁgures differ due to different methods 
of measurement the ratio of social to private returns is remarkably stable: it 
is about 2:1 (Griliches 1995). As a consequence, we have a market failure: 
private entrepreneurs tend to spend less on R&D than would be socially op-
timal. In fact, this is a market failure most industrialists and their lobbies are 
quite happy to admit, since it is used―quite successfully―as an argument 
for obtaining subsidies.
As I shall discuss below, things are not always that simple, and there 
are circumstances under which there is too much, or rather misdirected pri-
vate R&D investment. But let me pursue a bit more the problem of insuf-
ﬁcient generation of knowledge in a market economy. So far we have only 
discussed the occurrence of externalities without any direct use of the new 
knowledge by other economic agents. In many instances it is inevitable to 
give away at least some knowledge the moment it is actually used. Think for 
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example of the pharmaceutical industry. If a certain approach has turned out 
to work for some problem one can infer that it is quite likely to work at least 
for related problems.
A similar problem may affect the celebrated―though often doubted―ef-
ﬁciency of ﬁnancial markets. It is claimed by some economists that ﬁnancial 
market are extremely efﬁcient with respect to processing relevant informa-
tion about the prospects of ﬁrms. Now suppose it is indeed possible to obtain 
information about ﬁrms which can be proﬁtably used for transactions in the 
stock market. The problem is that other market participants can observe the 
actions of the agents who have obtained the information. This way the in-
formation is revealed and therefore is no longer proﬁtable. But if obtaining 
information is costly then nobody has an incentive to get informed as long as 
she can get the information for free by observing what the informed agents 
are doing. So eventually nobody will be informed. But if nobody is informed 
there is again an incentive to become informed, and no equilibrium exists. 
This problem, analyzed ﬁrst by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) may look very 
special, but it points to a much more general problem: Using information 
reveals it at least partly to others and thereby makes it less valuable.
To sum up this section, due to positive externalities which drive a wedge 
between social and private returns to the creation of knowledge and infor-
mation markets may produce too little of both.
4.4 Knowledge as a public good
Consulting again Mankiw (2004, p. 225) we ﬁnd the following deﬁnition: 
”Public goods are neither excludable nor rival. That is, people cannot be pre-
vented from using a public good, and one person’s use of a public good does 
not reduce another person’s ability to use it.” Interestingly, basic research, 
i.e. the creation of knowledge, is mentioned as an important example for a 
public good, immediately after national defense and before the old textbook 
favorite, the lighthouse. A distinction is drawn, however, between general 
knowledge, like a mathematical theorem, and speciﬁc knowledge, such as 
an invention of a better battery. Whereas the latter can be patented and hence 
exclusion is possible, the former cannot.
In a way this distinction is more apparent than real. The use of speciﬁc 
knowledge is not rival from a purely technical point of view: Your ability to 
produce a better battery does not affect my ability to do likewise. What is 
rival, however, is the commercial utilization of this speciﬁc knowledge: If 
we both produce the better battery we compete for consumers and our proﬁts 
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will go down. Here we are back again at Arrow’s dilemma.
While markets are not particularly good at providing public goods―since 
by deﬁnition they are not excludable it is impossible to charge a price for 
them―it has to be admitted that ﬁnding an efﬁcient decision procedure for 
the determination of the quantities and types of public goods to be produced 
is not a trivial task.
4.5 Imperfect information about knowledge
A crucial assumption of the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model is 
that all market participants have perfect information about the qualities and 
prices of all goods offered. Though some introspection reveals immediately 
that this assumption is wildly unrealistic its importance has been ignored for 
a long time. Taking into account that the information of market participants 
is not only incomplete, but also unequally distributed has far reaching im-
plications, which have been surveyed extensively by one of the pioneers of 
the economics of information, Joseph Stiglitz (2001). In this paper I want 
to discuss just a few aspects which are relevant when the commodity under 
consideration is knowledge.
A useful classiﬁcation of commodities based on the information of the 
consumer is the following:
1. Inspection goods: The buyer can evaluate the quality of a product on the 
spot before buying it.
2. Experience goods: The buyer learns the quality of a good only by using 
it, i.e. after buying it.
3. Credence goods: The buyer is never able to evaluate the quality of the 
good or service she has bought.
Knowledge as a commodity sometimes belongs to the ﬁrst category, but 
very often to the second and frequently to the third. In fact, if it is possible 
to evaluate the quality of some piece of knowledge before buying it there is 
a problem for a market to work: In order to be able to determine the value of 
knowledge for a buyer she needs to know what it is. But once she knows it 
herself she does not need to buy it. We shall return to this and similar prob-
lems in later sections.
Experience goods are more common than one might think at ﬁrst sight. 
Whether the car I am buying is of good quality or is what Americans call a 
“lemon” will only be revealed in the future. Closer to our topic, whether the 
lecture you are attending or the books you are reading are worth the time and 
money spent can only be said after you have done it.
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Credence goods are often provided by experts offering services of which 
the buyers cannot say whether they are really necessary and/or whether they 
have actually been performed (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Again cars 
are an example: Most of us cannot really determine whether a particular 
part has to be replaced and, once we have accepted the advice of the ex-
pert, whether it actually has been replaced. Medical treatments often display 
similar problems, and so do many professional services. Research, i.e. the 
creation of knowledge, is another example. Very often it is not even possi-
ble to tell ex post what the expert has actually done, since the outcome we 
observe is not only the result of his actions, but also of some random inﬂu-
ences. If we are lucky we get away without accident even if the brakes have 
not been repaired properly, and often we overcome some illness despite the 
treatment we receive (to be fair, both examples can as well be turned into 
their opposite).
More generally, in many markets we get asymmetric information: The 
seller knows more about the quality of the good or service he offers than the 
buyer. If providing better quality is costly then the seller has an incentive to 
offer quality which is worse than what he pretends to.
This may have important implications for the functioning of markets. In 
particular, prices may no longer be adjusted to equate supply and demand, 
but rather serve as an incentive and selection mechanism. Think of labor 
markets, and in particular of labor markets for scientists. It is not an easy 
task to monitor what a researcher in some university department actually 
does. If we see a scientist at his desk staring into emptiness we cannot really 
tell whether he is thinking of his girl friend or trying hard to solve a very 
difﬁcult problem. What we can really observe―at best―is the ﬁnal result, 
which depends on three things: the ability of the researcher, his effort, and 
on his good luck. Now suppose there is an excess supply of researchers. 
Should universities reduce salaries? If one believes in monetary incentives, 
the answer even most non-economists will like to hear is no! The reason is 
that lowering the salaries has two negative effects on the quality of research: 
There is an adverse selection effect since the most gifted researchers are 
likely to be able to ﬁnd better paid jobs elsewhere, and there is a moral haz-
ard problem, since badly paid researchers won’t care very much if they are 
ﬁred for lack of success, hence they have little incentives to exert a lot of 
effort (Akerlof and Yellen 1986).
Since the recruitment of scientists and the provision of incentives are 
crucial for the production of knowledge it should be obvious that relying on 
market forces alone will not do. They have to be supplemented by various 
other measures like peer reviews, measurement of impact and rankings, but 
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also by developing a social structure and a value system that induces scien-
tists to do their best. Ongoing debates about university reforms are a good 
indicator that this is not an easy task.
4.6 Private and social value of knowledge
If markets are supposed to be used to determine the production and distri-
bution of knowledge two conditions are necessary―though not sufﬁcient―
to ensure that the outcome is efﬁcient: Economic agents should be able to 
determine the value of the knowledge they are trading for themselves, and 
the private and social value of knowledge should be the same. We have 
already given examples above which show that under a variety of circum-
stances those conditions are not satisﬁed, but at this point I would like to 
discuss this problem in more detail.
4.6.1 Private value of knowledge
It has already been pointed out that knowledge as a commodity quite 
often can be viewed as an experience or even as a credence good, implying 
that a buyer does not know for sure the value of what she is about to get, but 
can only make a more or less informed guess. It has been shown some time 
ago that the winner of an auction for some object about which the bidders 
have different information and/or believes may suffer what has been termed 
as “the winner’s curse” (Wilson 1969). It means that it is not unlikely that 
the person who is willing to pay most is also the most optimistic one with 
exaggerated expectations. If you look for examples remember some of the 
UMTS-auctions a few years ago, or think of some transfers in professional 
football. In any case, the beliefs of individuals about the value of certain 
objects may lead to rather inefﬁcient decisions and thus impede the smooth 
functioning of markets.
 Interestingly, the private value of information may be negative, even if 
the information is perfectly correct, i.e. economic agents may be willing to 
pay if certain information does not become available (Hirshleifer 1971). As 
an example, suppose there is a village and people know that one of the hous-
es will be destroyed by ﬁre, ﬂood, or some other catastrophe, but they don’t 
know whose house it is. Assume it would be possible to ﬁnd out at small 
costs which house it will be. Now if people are risk averse then they would 
be willing to pay that this information is not obtained because as long as it is 
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unknown who will be hit by the disaster they would be willing to participate 
in a mutual insurance scheme. In fact, this example is less far fetched than it 
looks at ﬁrst sight. A very similar situation may arise in stock markets, and 
another example may gain dramatically in importance as early diagnoses of 
certain diseases become more accurate. As long as I only learn that I will 
get some disease, but without hope of prevention or cure, I would rather not 
know about it. In general, less information is often preferred to more if the 
latter reduces the opportunities for risk sharing.
4.6.2 Private vs. social value of knowledge
It has already been discussed above that knowledge is likely to generate 
positive externalities thus driving a wedge between the social and private 
return to knowledge creating activities. Similarly, as far as knowledge is a 
public good its private value is far below its social value because its use is 
not excludable.
While in both cases the social value of knowledge is greater than its pri-
vate value in some cases this relationship is reversed. Consider a so called 
“patent race”: several ﬁrms are trying to make a certain innovation, say a 
new medicine, a new electronic device or what you have. Now for society as 
a whole it does not really matter whether the discovery is made a few days 
or even months sooner or later. For those participating in the race, however, 
it very often makes all the difference to be ﬁrst or only second, since usually 
“the winner takes it all”. As an example, just recall the battle between dif-
ferent video recording systems: In the end VHS was the only survivor, not 
necessarily because it was the best system, but because it was the ﬁrst in the 
market and had an “installed base” of users which could not be successfully 
attacked by its competitors. In fact, this was not due to obtaining a patent 
at ﬁrst, but because video systems are an interesting example of network 
goods, a phenomenon we shall return to below. Note that such races are not 
only found in the commercial sphere, they occur as well in academia. As an 
example, consider the current race of some leading quantum physicists for 
the longest distance over which entangled light can be sent or for the ﬁrst us-
able quantum computer. Of course I wish my esteemed colleague and friend 
of the University of Vienna, Anton Zeilinger, that he wins this race. How-
ever, without denying in the least the importance of this work, from a social 
point of view it does not matter all that much whether he succeeds a few 
weeks earlier or later, though it may be extremely important for him since 
the reputation―and the ﬁnancial reward―of being ﬁrst is disproportionally 
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greater than of being second.
But it is not only in winner takes it all situations that the private value of 
knowledge exceeds its social value. Some innovations are hardly improve-
ments as compared to existing best practices and serve only to shift proﬁts 
from one ﬁrm to another. Market guided research may also lead to other 
inefﬁciencies. There may be too much duplication of efforts, and coordina-
tion of research activities would be socially preferable. A related problem 
concerns the variety of approaches. It can be shown that under certain as-
sumptions ﬁrms tend to pursue very similar research strategies where from 
a social point of view a diversiﬁcation would be better. Again this has to 
do with risk aversion: If I do something similar as my competitor I forego 
the chance to come up with something truly unique, but I reduce the risk of 
a complete failure. It may be better to succeed―or fail―in the same way 
as my competitor than to fail because I tried to do something completely 
different. Again the situation is often quite similar in Academia: It may be 
safer to remain within the mainstream without much hope of coming up with 
something revolutionary (and valuable), but without much risk to be deemed 
an unqualiﬁed failure. The problem is that for the individual researcher it is 
almost impossible to diversify her lines of research, so if she fails she bears 
the whole burden alone.
To sum up this section we note that it is often very difﬁcult for a person 
to determine the value of some piece of knowledge or information; if the 
private value can be determined it often differs from the social value; and 
private risk taking may differ from socially efﬁcient risk taking.
4.7 Network effects
A network good has the property that its utility for an individual user is 
increasing in the number of other users. An obvious example is telecommu-
nication: If there is only one person who owns a telephone its usefulness is 
quite limited. Many types of knowledge and knowledge goods are character-
ized by such network effects. The ICT-sector has been the most spectacular 
and fastest growing network industry, but it is by no means the only one. 
Network industries have been the subject of extensive research in recent 
years because they have interesting and important implications for the func-
tioning of markets (Shy 2001).
One of them is the possibility of lock-in effects. As has been shown by 
Brian Arthur (1989), society may get stuck with an inferior technology, ei-
ther because it was the ﬁrst and already had a large number of users―the 
180
so called installed base―by the time a better technology was available, or 
because it was superior at the beginning for a small number of users and thus 
got introduced, while a technology that would have been better for a large 
number of users never got started. An often quoted―though disputed―ex-
ample is our QWERTY-keyboard. Attacking an incumbent producer of a 
network good with a strong installed base is quite a risky business, even if a 
better product is available. Very often there are substantial switching costs―
users have to learn how to operate the alternative, i.e. their old knowledge 
becomes obsolete and has to be replaced by a new one, and this makes it 
harder to get a critical mass of users necessary to compete with the incum-
bent. One may speculate at this point how far these considerations apply for 
Academia when it comes to changing the prevalent paradigm.
Some of the most important network goods, especially computer hard-
ware and software, display crucial complementarities, i.e. consist of several 
components which are only useful when put together. A computer is use-
less without operating system, and the operating system by itself is useless 
without supporting software. Interestingly, it has been shown that under a 
wide variety of circumstances producers of various components have strong 
incentives to make their products compatible. The main reason is that mak-
ing some components compatible softens competition for others. The logic 
is as follows: Suppose you have two components, hardware and some soft-
ware. The software is a network good. Now if there are two producers and 
their machines are not software compatible, i.e. in order to use a machine 
you have to use the software of its producer, then competition is very stiff 
because in order to sell the machine I have to ensure a sufﬁciently large 
installed base. If both machines are software compatible then the network 
beneﬁts are the same for both machines and price competition between them 
becomes weaker.
Similarly, it is in the interest of producers that their operating systems 
are compatible with as many supporting software products as possible. So 
it is not surprising that technology sharing and open source are frequently 
encountered in this sector. At the same time it must be mentioned that in 
some situations private ﬁrms may have a strong incentive to keep relevant 
knowledge to themselves, even when it would be socially desirable to share 
it. This is particularly true if the incumbent is or feels strong enough to ﬁght 
off any entrant.
To sum up this section we note that network effects are likely to produce 
markets with a dominant incumbent who is difﬁcult to attack once he has 
established himself. It takes either a far superior product and/or a very strong 
entrant to be successful. On the other hand, if there are several producers of 
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comparable strength competition between them may well lead to technology 
sharing and socially desirable outcomes.
4.8 Trading knowledge
As we have seen when knowledge is regarded as a commodity which can 
be traded in a market like any other commodity we encounter a number of 
difﬁculties which are likely to lead to inefﬁcient outcomes and various types 
of market failures: 
• The paradigm of perfect competition which is at the heart of the ﬁrst 
welfare theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model is unlikely to be applicable 
since economies of scale and scope as well as network externalities more 
often then not will generate ﬁrms with considerable market power. 
• Positive externalities, but also winner takes it all situations and business 
stealing effects drive a wedge between private and social costs and ben-
eﬁts of knowledge. In addition, risk aversion may lead to socially inefﬁ-
cient behavior. Taken together this implies that socially optimal activities 
for the creation of knowledge are the exception rather than the rule. 
• As far as knowledge is a public good there is little incentive for its crea-
tion, on the other hand granting patents and intellectual property rights, 
while providing such incentives, hampers the socially efﬁcient use of 
knowledge. 
• Finally, it is often very difﬁcult to determine the value of knowledge in 
advance, and often it is not clear what a particular piece of knowledge 
is actually worth even after one has acquired it. Clearly, this uncertainty 
does not help markets to perform well.
There is at least one additional difﬁculty which so far has not been dealt with 
explicitly. If I sell speciﬁc knowledge which can be used proﬁtably I don’t 
actually give it away. If I tell somebody something I know I still know it 
afterwards. Obviously, this seriously limits the willingness to pay for knowl-
edge. Unfortunately, the effect also works the other way round. If I want to 
sell speciﬁc knowledge I have to tell the potential buyer what it is all about. 
But once I have told him how can I stop him from using it without paying 
anything?
To sum up, markets do not seem to do very well when it comes to the 
creation and distribution of knowledge, and one might understand why eco-
nomics has been referred to as the “dismal science”. However, a few words 
of caution are in order. 
First of all, the benchmark we have used for evaluating market perform-
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ance is an extremely demanding one: It is the ﬁrst best outcome in a perfect 
world, in which an omniscient and benevolent planner optimizes some well 
deﬁned welfare function. It should come as no surprise that market outcomes 
fall short of such an optimum.
Secondly, having shown that markets are unlikely to deliver a ﬁrst best 
solution does not mean that there exists another institutional setting which 
fares any better. Note that many problems we have mentioned are intrinsic 
problems of knowledge and not of markets, i.e. they will be encountered in 
any alternative setup as well. 
Thirdly, markets and the forces of competition have been remarkably in-
novative with respect to ﬁnding new ways of organizing the production and 
distribution of goods and services under changing technological conditions. 
Much has been made of networks and open source, some authors claim that 
this is a completely new way of organizing the production and distribution 
of goods, outside and in addition to the traditional forms of ﬁrms (hierar-
chies) and markets (polyarchies) (Benkler 2001, 2006, Powell 1990). While 
I ﬁnd these contributions interesting, thought provoking and informative, 
I also ﬁnd some of their claims exaggerated. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to go into details, but it should be mentioned that markets and ﬁrms 
do play a crucial role in networks. Firms are part of several networks, in fact 
they are central organizers in some of them; ﬁrms have emerged as a conse-
quence of successful open source projects; ﬁrms have created open source 
networks inside themselves; the products of open source networks compete 
in markets; and several such projects would not be possible without com-
mercial competitors or forerunners. In my view, networks at different levels 
and with different internal organizations are one, alas an important reaction 
to some of the problems pointed out above, but in my view they are part of 
the market economy and they can be fruitfully analyzed and understood with 
the tools developed in economics (Lerner and Tirole 2002, 2005).
5. Research Agenda
It seems to be necessary to come down from the level of generality used 
in this survey and to be more concrete. It has to be acknowledged that there 
is no such thing as a commodity “knowledge” which can be treated as ho-
mogeneous at least to the same degree as cars or computers. “Knowledge” is 
created in various forms, under various conditions and for various purposes, 
and it looks impossible to determine its properties and its handling in markets 
or other institutions without specifying the context. So in some sense we are 
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back at the old and unsolved epistemological question what knowledge is. 
However, economic considerations along the lines presented above should 
be helpful. We should look at the type of knowledge we are considering, and 
Machlup’s classiﬁcation is probably a good starting point. We should look at 
the technical conditions under which knowledge is produced, e.g. the extent 
to which it can be modularized, and we should look at the ways in which it 
can be utilized, commercially and otherwise. And ﬁnally, we should keep in 
mind that economics provides a useful way to look at things, but it needs to 
be supplemented by the insights of other disciplines as well.
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